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Two studies examined how the relevance of group identity influences two psychological
mechanisms of collective action: Emotion- and problem-focused coping with collective
disadvantage. Extending Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach’s (2004) integrative
theoretical model of coping with collective disadvantage, we predicted that when group
identity is more relevant to disadvantaged group members, it increases their collective
action tendencies through their feelings of group-based anger about their group’s
disadvantage. When group identity is less relevant and hence emotion-focused coping
processes are less likely, group-efficacy beliefs become more predictive of disadvantaged
group members’ collective action tendencies because people focus more instrumentally
on whether collective action will be effective (and benefit them) or not. A field study
and a follow-up experiment both showed that the relevance of group identity facilitated
emotion-focused coping and moderated problem-focused coping with collective
disadvantage. We discuss these results in terms of two distinct psychological
mechanisms of collective action.
Individuals for whom group identity is more relevant are more likely to participate in
collective action against a disadvantage suffered by their group (e.g. a rise in tuition fees
for students) than individuals for whom group identity is less relevant (Ellemers, 1993;
Kelly, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004;
Tajfel, 1978). However, less is known about why people, for whom group identity is
more or less relevant, engage in collective action. For example, some have argued that
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higher identifiers with a group are more intrinsically motivated to engage in collective
action than lower identifiers (Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004), and are more committed to
group (rather than individual) goals and interests (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999;
Ouwerkerk, De Gilder, & De Vries, 2000). In contrast, lower identifiers with a group are
argued to be more pragmatic and instrumental in engaging in collective action because
they are less committed to group goals and interests (e.g. Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers,
2002), and are more extrinsically motivated to engage in collective action (Stu¨rmer &
Simon, 2004).
In this article, we explore two potential psychological underpinnings of the
collective action tendencies of individuals for whom group identity is more or less
relevant as a result of more chronic (e.g. group identification; see Ellemers et al., 1999;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or more contextual factors (e.g. features that make group identity
salient; see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Extending Van Zomeren,
Spears, Fischer, and Leach’s (2004) integrative theoretical model of coping with
collective disadvantage, we propose that when group identity is more relevant for
members of disadvantaged groups, people focus more on group concerns, and this
facilitates their collective action tendencies through group-based anger on the basis of
group-based appraisal of unfair disadvantage (Mackie & Smith, 2002; Smith, 1993; see
also Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, &
Gordijn, 2003).
In contrast, when group identity is less relevant, and people focus less on group
concerns, they should experience less group-based anger and hence display reduced
collective action tendencies. However, in this case, individuals may still want to engage
in collective action if they appraise collective action to be effective and beneficial to
them (e.g. Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1999). In this sense, group efficacy (see
Bandura, 1995, 1997; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke,
1999) should become more predictive of collective action tendencies when relevance of
group identity is lower. In terms of the integrative model, translating group-based anger
into collective action tendencies is conceptualized as emotion-focused coping, and
translating group efficacy into collective action tendencies is conceptualized as
problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage (see Lazarus, 1991, 2001).
Therefore, we predicted that the relevance of group identity facilitates emotion-focused
coping, and moderates problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage, and
tested this analysis in a field study and a follow-up laboratory experiment.
Psychological mechanisms of collective action
Collective action in response to collective disadvantage is a complicated social
phenomenon for which numerous explanations have been offered (for reviews, see
Klandermans, 1997; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004). However, there seems to be some
consensus that identity, injustice, and efficacy are important social and psychological
explanations of collective action (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Stu¨rmer & Simon,
2004; for a meta-analysis, see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2007). For example,
relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, &
Williams, 1949) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) both focus on the
degree to which group members perceive their disadvantage as based in group identity
(see Kawakami & Dion, 1992; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Smith &
Spears, 1996), and in perceptions of unfairness or undeservingness (e.g. Cook, Crosby,
354 Martijn van Zomeren et al.
Copyright © The British Psychological Society
Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society
& Hennigan, 1977; Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1987; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker & Smith,
2002). In contrast, other approaches focus on more instrumental explanations of
collective action that emphasize group members’ sense of efficacy to ‘solve’ group-
related problems such as collective disadvantage (e.g. Martin, Brickman, & Murray,
1984; Mummendey et al., 1999), and on the mobilization of resources to enforce social
change (Klandermans, 1984, 1997; McCarthy & Zald, 1977).
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) proposed that these different approaches fit nicely with a
conceptual distinction between emotion- and problem-focused coping with collective
disadvantage. A key difference between these two means of coping is that the former
regulates the emotions tied to the situation, whereas the latter regulates the
mobilization of actions for the explicit purpose of changing reality (e.g. Folkman &
Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 1991, 2001). And although the model explicitly suggests that
collective disadvantage makes group identity salient, the main aim of the current
research is to elucidate the role of the relevance of this group identity in emotion- and
problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage. In other words, the current work
specifies and extends this model by exploring the influence of the relevance of group
identity on the two ‘paths to protest’.
Emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage
According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), when group identity is
made relevant by contextual factors (such as features that make group identity salient),
or chronic factors (such as group identification), individuals perceive themselves and
their social world more in group terms. Thus, when group identity is more relevant,
individuals should attend more to group-level concerns such as collective disadvantage
and its injustice (see also Kawakami & Dion, 1992). As such, collective action against
collective disadvantage should be more likely when group identity is more relevant.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, theory and research on group identification and
collective action suggests that group identification is a good predictor of collective
action (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996;
Mummendey et al., 1999; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Veenstra &
Haslam, 2000; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; for a meta-analysis see Van Zomeren
et al., 2007). For example, Simon, Stu¨rmer, and colleagues have repeatedly found that
identification with a social movement is a unique predictor of collective action
intentions and participation on behalf of that social movement (e.g. Simon et al., 1998;
see Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004), independent of individual cost–benefit motivations for
collective action (Klandermans, 1984). In line with this analysis, Ellemers et al. (1999)
suggested that higher identifiers are more concerned about and committed to group
goals and interests than lower identifiers (who are more committed to their individual
goals and interests).
Moreover, different approaches suggest that collective action is more likely when
group identity is relevant because the relevance of group identity facilitates group-based
emotions such as anger, based on group-based appraisals such as unfairness. The relative
deprivation literature, for example, shows that individuals are more likely to engage in
collective action when they perceive their group as a whole as suffering an unjust
disadvantage (e.g. Dube´-Simard & Guimond, 1986; Guimond & Dube´-Simard, 1983;
Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007; for a meta-analysis, see Smith &
Ortiz, 2002). Indeed, stronger group identification leads to a greater perception of
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collective disadvantage and injustice (Mummendey et al., 1999; Smith & Spears, 1996;
Tropp & Wright, 1999).
Furthermore, it has become increasingly clear that it is the affective component of
relative deprivation that best predicts collective action (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). This fits
with recent theory on group-based emotions suggesting that a relevant group identity
facilitates the experience of group emotion grounded in group-based appraisals that
serve as the psychological basis of the emotion (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Mackie &
Smith, 2002; Smith, 1993). Thus, in line with appraisal theories of emotion (for an
overview see Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), a relevant group
identity facilitates the group-level appraisal that a collective disadvantage is unjust and
thereby promotes the group-based emotion of anger (e.g. Dumont et al., 2003; Mackie,
Devos, & Smith, 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Specific group-
based emotions like anger are theorized to have distinct implications in terms of specific
action tendencies (like wanting to move against the out-group; Frijda, 1986; Frijda,
Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993).
Taken together, all these different approaches suggest that when group identity is more
relevant, emotion-focused coping is facilitated because people make group-based
appraisals that shape group-based emotions which predict collective action tendencies.
Problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage
When relevance of group identity is lower, people should experience less group-based
anger and be less motivated to engage in collective action (i.e. less emotion-focused
coping). However, this does not mean that when the relevance of group identity is
lower, people do not engage in collective action at all. Rather, people may simply cope
differently with collective disadvantage, but with implications for whether or not they
engage in collective action. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) suggested that people can also
engage in problem-focused coping, which regulates the mobilization of actions for the
explicit purpose of changing reality, in terms of their group-efficacy beliefs.
There are at least two theoretical reasons for why group-efficacy beliefs should
become more predictive of individuals’ collective action tendencies when the relevance
of group identity is lower. First, there is little reason to expect the relevance of group
identity to ‘solve’ the problem of collective disadvantage by itself (Mummendey et al.,
1999; see also Bandura, 1995, 1997). From an appraisal theory perspective (e.g. Lazarus,
1991, 2001), appraisals that signal relevance (e.g. of group identity) are differentiated
from appraisals that signal power, control, or strength of the group to respond to the
relevant event (for a specific discussion see Smith & Kessler, 2004). Stronger relevance
of group identity (as a so-called primary appraisal) should therefore generate a stronger
group-based emotional response to collective disadvantage, but not necessarily generate
a stronger sense of group efficacy. Rather, group-based appraisals of power, control, and
strength of the in-group (like group efficacy) should be more likely bases of problem-
focused coping with collective disadvantage (see also Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Weaker
relevance of group identity therefore requires more of a focus on such so-called
secondary appraisals that influence decisions to engage in collective action.
Second, another line of research suggests that lower identifiers with a group are less
committed to group goals and hence are more pragmatic and instrumental, typically
engaging in collective action to achieve group goals that coincide with their individual
goals (e.g. Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1999). Ouwerkerk et al. (2000), for
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example, showed that higher identifiers with a group increased their efforts for their
group after collective failure, whereas lower identifiers ‘dropped out’ more when their
group started to reflect negatively on them. Furthermore, Doosje et al. showed that, in
contrast to higher identifiers, lower identifiers stuck more with their group when
chances of social change were more likely in terms of instability of the intergroup status
differential. Finally, Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) showed that political-efficacy beliefs
were a better predictor of collective action among low-identified women than among
highly identified women.
Taken together, all these results suggest that when relevance of group identity is
lower, people attend less to group goals, and people focus on more pragmatic and
instrumental benefits of engaging in collective action. More specifically, we expect that
group-efficacy beliefs predict collective action tendencies more strongly when the
relevance of group identity is lower. In sum, we expect the relevance of group identity
to facilitate emotion-focused coping, and to moderate problem-focused coping with
collective disadvantage.
We tested these two hypotheses in two empirical studies. For purposes of external
and internal validity, we decided to test our predictions in the field as well as in the
laboratory. Study 1 provided an opportunity for examining our hypotheses among
participants of a student demonstration against financial cuts on higher education (that
took place on March 15, 2004, in Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Study 2 aimed to
experimentally test our two hypotheses in a controlled laboratory setting.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and procedure
Sixty-one participants (28 males, 33 females, mean age 20.61 years) participated in a
field study during a real-life demonstration in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Participants
were recruited out of the few hundred involved in the demonstration and asked to
complete a survey. After completing the survey, participants were thanked for their
effort and given a chocolate bar.
Materials
Survey introduction
Participants received a booklet that introduced the collective disadvantage. This
introduction stated that the government wanted to cut down its educational expenses,
and that liberalization of the annual college fees students pay in the Dutch system would
allow universities to raise these fees. As a consequence, an independent research body
associated with the University of Amsterdam wanted to investigate the attitudes of
students towards these cuts.
Survey measures
After having introduced the topic of investigation, participants were asked to respond to
questions on 7-point Likert-type scales (i.e. 1, not at all, 7, very much). First, as an
indicator of the (more chronic) relevance of group identity, we measured group
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identification with four items (i.e. ‘I see myself as/am glad to be a student’, ‘I
identify/feel connected with other students’; a ¼ :78). Second, derived from Van
Zomeren et al. (2004), we measured group-based anger with four items (a ¼ :85; e.g. ‘I
feel angry/irritated/furious/displeased because of this proposal’); we used a three-
item measure of group efficacy (a ¼ :92; e.g. ‘I think together we are able to change
this situation/we are able to stop this proposal/that students can successfully stand
up for their rights’), and collective action tendencies with five items (a ¼ :72; e.g. ‘I
would participate in a future demonstration to stop this proposal/participate in
raising our collective voice to stop this proposal/do something together with fellow
students to stop this proposal/participate in some form of collective action to stop this
proposal/sign a petition to stop this proposal’).1
Principal components analysis (PCA) with Oblimin rotation (allowing factors to be
correlated) showed four factors (group identification, group-based anger, group efficacy,
and collective action tendencies), explaining 67.91% of the variance, with items loading
strongly on their respective factor (factor loadings . .62).2 These results support the
construct validity of our measures. We also obtained background variable measures such
as home town, study major, political preference, and whether participants were a
member of a student union. None of these background variables had significant effects
on our key dependent measures.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Our participant sample was highly heterogeneous. Although almost half of our sample
(N ¼ 30) lived in Amsterdam, the remaining 31 participants came from different
(university) cities in The Netherlands (such as Utrecht, Nijmegen, Leiden, Rotterdam,
Wageningen, and Maastricht). Study majors were also very different across the sample,
ranging from Philosophy and History to Physics, Law, and Political Science. Only
nine participants studied Psychology. Furthermore, only 14 out of 61 participants were
members of a national student union. The vast majority of these participants (50 out of
61) voted for left-wing parties. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our key
measures.
Hypothesis testing
We first tested for the hypothesized effects of group identification on group-based anger
and collective action tendencies using multiple regression analysis (Baron & Kenny,
1986). In the first step, we found that group identification predicted collective action
1 In line with the idea that group-based appraisal of injustice is a basis of emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage
(and in particular procedural unfairness), we included a two-item measure of procedural unfairness (‘I think that students are
being treated unfairly by the government’ and ‘These plans of the government suggest to me that they do not take students
seriously’), with r ¼ :60, p , :001. Group identification predicted this measure (b ¼ 0:35, p , :01), and when group
identification and procedural unfairness were entered to predict group-based anger, procedural unfairness predicted group-
based anger (b ¼ 0:39, p , :01) whereas group identification no longer did (b ¼ 0:22, p ¼ :07). The indirect effect was
significant, Sobel’s z ¼ 2:14, p ¼ :03.
2One item (‘I would participate in raising our collective voice to stop this proposal’) in the collective action scale had a loading
lower than .60 on its factor (namely .40). However, results with or without inclusion of this item in the collective action scale
were not dramatically different. Since this item did load quite highly on its factor in the pilot study and in Study 2, we decided to
retain the item in the analysis on these grounds.
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tendencies (b ¼ 0:29, p ¼ :03). In the second step, group identification predicted
group-based anger (b ¼ 0:35, p , :01). However, group identification did not predict
group efficacy (b ¼ 20:20, p ¼ :12). In the final step, group-based anger predicted
collective action tendencies (b ¼ 0:54, p , :001), whereas group identification was no
longer a predictor of collective action tendencies (b ¼ 0:10, p ¼ :40). Indeed, a Sobel
Test (z ¼ 2:47, p ¼ :02) confirmed that the indirect effect was significant. Although
correlational data cannot, by definition, imply causality, these results are consistent with
our hypothesis that group identification increases collective action tendencies through
group-based anger (i.e. emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage).3
We then tested for the hypothesized interaction effect between group identification
and group efficacy on collective action tendencies by running another multiple
regression in which the effects of group identification, group efficacy, group-based
anger, and the two-way interactions between group identification and group efficacy,
and between group identification and group-based anger were entered to predict
collective action tendencies (Aiken & West, 1991). The results showed significant
effects only for group-based anger (b ¼ 0:53, p , :001), and for the interaction between
group identification and group efficacy (b ¼ 20:26, p ¼ :05). None of the other effects
were significant (bs , j0:19j, ps . :15). As can be seen in Figure 1, lower identifiers
indeed displayed stronger collective action tendencies when their group-efficacy beliefs
were stronger (b ¼ 0:45, p ¼ :09). Also in line with predictions, group efficacy did not
predict collective action tendencies for higher identifiers (b ¼ 20:11, p ¼ :52). Thus,
these results provide initial support for our second hypothesis that group identification
Table 1.Mean scores and standard deviations for, and correlations between, main dependent variables
in Study 1
2. 3. 4.
1. Group identification .35* 2 .20 .29*
M 5.66
SD 1.04
2. Group-based anger 2 .03 .57*
M 4.50
SD 1.45
3. Group efficacy .02
M 4.25
SD 1.46
4. Collective action tendencies
M 5.51
SD 1.02
Note. *p , :05.
3We assume a causal path from group-based anger to collective action tendencies in these analyses, which is supported by
theory (e.g. Smith, 1993) and research (e.g. Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In Study 1 and 2, we also tested
for the reverse mediation sequence (from relevance of group identity to group-based anger through collective action
tendencies). In Study 1, results were inconclusive because the reverse mediation sequence resulted in a significant (but smaller)
indirect effect (Sobel’s z ¼ 2:07, p ¼ :05; vs. z ¼ 2:47, p ¼ :02, for the sequence we argue for). The explained direct effect
was also smaller for the reversed mediation sequence than for the sequence we argue for (b ¼ 0:10 vs. b ¼ 0:20). In Study
2, results were more conclusive as they showed that the indirect effect for the reverse mediation sequence was not significant,
Sobel’s z ¼ 1:76, p ¼ :08.
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moderates the link between group efficacy and collective action tendencies
(i.e. problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed support for our hypotheses concerning the differential
influence of the relevance of group identity on emotion- and problem-focused coping
with collective disadvantage. Results supported our first prediction that stronger
relevance of group identity (as indicated by stronger group identification) results in
stronger collective action tendencies through stronger feelings of group-based anger.
Second, we also found some support for our second prediction that group efficacy
predicts collective action tendencies more strongly when the relevance of group
identity is lower. In fact, group efficacy did not predict collective action tendencies for
higher identifiers. More generally, the relevance of group identity facilitated emotion-
focused coping, and moderated problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage.
The first effect emphasizes that the relevance of group identity facilitates group-
based emotions like anger in the context of unfair collective disadvantage. Our
reasoning is that stronger relevance of group identity gives rise to group-based appraisal
of unfairness, group-based anger, and collective action tendencies (see also Kessler &
Holbach, 2005; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Smith, 1993; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Moreover, the
group identification by group-efficacy interaction effect suggests that lower relevance of
group identity results in group-efficacy beliefs predicting collective action tendencies
more strongly. Indeed, lower relevance of group identity should make emotion-focused
coping less likely. However, lower relevance of group identity also makes people focus
more pragmatically and instrumentally on achieving individual goals that coincide with
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Figure 1. Two-way interaction effect between group identification and group efficacy on collective
action tendencies, Study 1.
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group goals, and therefore their perception of the group’s efficacy should predict their
collective action tendencies more strongly.
However, Study 1 is not without its limitations. For example, people had already
chosen to participate in a particular collective action (i.e. a public protest event), and it
seems indeed likely that they were at the protest partly because their group identity was
very relevant to them. Moreover, people were immersed in a crowd when filling out the
questionnaire, which may also increase the relevance of group identity. However, note
that these limitations should only work against our two key hypotheses (that are based
on differences between higher and lower relevance of group identity). Nonetheless, a
fairer test of our two hypotheses can be provided in a more controlled laboratory setting
where people can be isolated from other group members, and where the range in group
relevance is less restricted to the upper end. Therefore, we decided to validate the
Study 1 results by conducting a follow-up laboratory experiment in which we
manipulated the relevance of group identity by making students’ group or personal
identity contextually salient. Although group identification and group identity salience
are conceptually distinct variables (Ellemers et al., 1999; Turner et al., 1987), they are
also related in their predicted effects; the former implies a more chronic, and the latter a
more contextual, relevance of group identity. Therefore, focusing on salience in this
study also provides an opportunity to test for the robustness and generality of our
arguments concerning group relevance. Hence, we predicted that the salience of group
identity (in Study 2) would have similar effects as group identification (in Study 1).
STUDY 2
Before conducting the actual experiment, we ran a pilot study to demonstrate the
construct validity of our key measures. Rather than relying on PCA we decided to use
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA; as recommended by Russell, 2002). We therefore
needed a larger sample size than for the experiment itself. One hundred and thirteen
students at the University of Amsterdam (29 males, 84 females, mean age 21.03 years)
participated by filling out a survey on a salient collective disadvantage issue. As in Van
Zomeren et al. (2004, Study 1), students were placed in the position of having an unfair
collective disadvantage by leading them to believe that the university would decide on a
college fee increase without giving students voice in the decision. This would also be the
issue used in Study 2.
We measured group-based anger with four items (i.e. ‘I feel angry/irritated/fur-
ious/displeased because of this proposal by the Board’), group efficacy with four items
(i.e. ‘I think together we are able to change this situation/we are able to stop this
proposal/that students can successfully stand up for their rights against the
Board/that students can really influence these decisions of the Board’), and collective
action tendencies with four items (i.e. ‘I would participate in a demonstration to stop
this proposal/participate in raising our collective voice to stop this proposal/do
something together with fellow students to stop this proposal/participate in some
form of collective action to stop this proposal’). We dropped the ‘sign a petition’ item
(as compared with Study 1) because preliminary analyses and results suggested that this
item was only a weak indicator of the collective action tendencies construct in this
study. All items employed 7-point Likert-type scales (i.e. 1, not at all, 7, very much). The
scales proved reliable (group-based anger, a ¼ :88; group efficacy, a ¼ :88; collective
action tendencies, a ¼ :94).
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We then assessed the latent structure of our dependent variables by performing
a CFA on these 12 items with three latent factors representing group-based anger,
group efficacy, and collective action tendencies. Each item was allowed to load only
on its designated latent factor and no errors were allowed to correlate. Each latent
factor was allowed to correlate to the other latent factors. The results showed that
our hypothesized model of the three latent factors provided satisfactory fit to the
data. Excellent fit is indicated when the x2/df ratio is below 2, whereas good fit is
indicated when this ratio is between 2 and 3. In our case the value of x2 was
105.81 with 51 d.f., which means that the ratio ( ¼ 2.07) indeed falls below 2 and
3, indicative of good fit. Inspection of two relevant central and residual fit indices
corroborated this conclusion (CFI ¼ :94; SRMR ¼ :06). Inspection of the parameter
estimates showed that all items loaded highly on their designated factor (all factor
loadings . .69). Furthermore, the correlations between the latent factors were in
line with findings from previous work: Group-based anger and group efficacy were
unrelated (r ¼ :06, ns), whereas the correlations between group-based anger and
collective action tendencies (r ¼ :61, p , :05), and between group efficacy and
collective action tendencies (r ¼ :29, p , :05) were positive and significant (Van
Zomeren et al., 2004).
In sum, results show that a) the three key constructs can be empirically
distinguished at the level of latent factors and b) their interrelationships replicate those
found in previous research. We therefore used these measures in the following
experiment.
Method
Participants and design
Forty-five students of the University of Amsterdam (16 males, 29 females, mean age
21.07 years) participated in an experiment for required course credit. Participants were
randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions (group vs. personal identity
salience). Then they started the remainder of the experiment that was disguised as a
survey conducted by an independent research body. This (bogus) survey was about ‘the
opinion of first-year Psychology students at the University of Amsterdam towards a
recent plan of the University Board’. Participants were informed that the plan was about
the raising of the college fees students have to pay annually. As in Van Zomeren et al.
(2004, Study 1), students were placed in the position of having an unfair collective
disadvantage by leading them to believe that the university would decide on a college
fee increase without giving students voice in the decision. After completing the survey,
participants were thanked and excused.
Procedure
We manipulated the salience of individual’s personal or group identity by asking
participants to write down a typical day in their life, either as a student (group identity
salience condition) or as an individual (personal identity salience condition). In
essence, by making the student group identity salient, we increased the ‘normative fit’
(Turner et al., 1987) between participants’ salient group identity and the collective
disadvantage we presented them with. This normative fit should increase the
psychological relevance and meaningfulness of participants’ collective disadvantage as
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students. Participants were given five minutes to write down their typical day. Then,
the bogus survey started. All participants read the following: ‘As you might have heard,
there are government plans for financial cuts affecting all universities in The
Netherlands. If these plans would be adopted, all universities will then have to solve
the problem of wishing to maintain high levels of quality education while lacking
sufficient funds to fulfil this wish. Therefore, the University of Amsterdam has
forwarded a plan to raise annual college fees for its students by 200 euros (which
equals about US $250). Then, participants read the following: ‘To illustrate this plan,
University Board member J. Verhagen recently said in an interview, “Cuts always hit
hard, but what can we do about it? If our students want to maintain their high level of
quality education, we think they should pay more. Moreover, we feel that students do
not understand the problems we are facing. Therefore, we wish to make this decision
without student approval”’.
Dependent measures
We measured group-based anger, group efficacy, and collective action tendencies with
four items each (all similar to those used in the pilot study). The scales again proved
reliable (group-based anger, a ¼ :82; group efficacy, a ¼ :92; collective action
tendencies, a ¼ :95).4 As an objective check of our manipulation, we analysed the
texts participants wrote for words or phrases indicating activities based in their student
rather than personal identity (e.g. studying, going to classes, spending time with fellow
students).
Results
Preliminary analysis
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the number of words related to student identity
as the dependent variable and identity salience as the independent variable showed a
significant main effect, Fð1; 43Þ ¼ 12:94, p , :001, h2 ¼ :23. Participants indeed
referred more to their student identity when their group identity was salient
(M ¼ 3:65, SD ¼ 1:90) than when their personal identity was salient (M ¼ 2:00,
SD ¼ 1:15).
Analyses of means
Group-based anger
As predicted, an ANOVA with group-based anger as our dependent variable and the
identity salience manipulation as the independent variable revealed a significant main
effect, Fð1; 43Þ ¼ 5:51, p ¼ :02, h2 ¼ :11. Inspection of the means showed that group
identity salience indeed resulted in stronger feelings of group-based anger (M ¼ 4:74,
SD ¼ 0:96) than personal identity salience (M ¼ 3:97, SD ¼ 1:18).
4 PCA performed on these items resulted in the predicted three-factor solution when the eigenvalue for extracting a factor was
set to .96 rather than 1.00. Explained variance was 78.98%. Consistent with the CFA in the pilot study, all items loaded highly
(. .79) on their respective factors of group-based anger, group efficacy, and collective action tendencies. When taking into
consideration the small sample size in Study 2, and the CFA results of the pilot study, one may conclude that our measures can
be empirically distinguished.
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Group efficacy
We conducted an ANOVA with group efficacy as our dependent variable and the identity
salience manipulation as the independent variable. The results showed no significant
main effect of identity salience on group efficacy, Fð1; 43Þ ¼ 1:59, p ¼ :22
(Msocial ¼ 4:60 vs. Mpersonal ¼ 4:08, with SDs of 1.52 and 1.25, respectively). Thus,
identity salience did not affect group efficacy.
Collective action tendencies
An ANOVA with collective action tendencies as our dependent variable and the identity
salience manipulation as the independent variable showed a marginally significant main
effect, Fð1; 43Þ ¼ 3:72, p ¼ :06, h2 ¼ :08. As predicted, group identity salience resulted
in somewhat stronger collective action tendencies (M ¼ 4:95, SD ¼ 1:44) than personal
identity salience (M ¼ 4:03, SD ¼ 1:70).
Hypothesis testing
Table 2 shows the correlations between the key variables for the full sample. To test
whether the identity salience manipulation affected collective action tendencies
through feelings of group-based anger, we used multiple regression analysis (Baron &
Kenny, 1986). First, we checked whether the identity salience manipulation affected
group-based anger (b ¼ 0:34, p ¼ :02), but not group efficacy (b ¼ 0:19, p ¼ :22).
Then, we examined whether the marginal effect of identity salience on collective action
tendencies (b ¼ 0:28, p ¼ :06) turned non-significant when entering group-based anger
in the equation. Indeed, the effect of the manipulation on collective action tendencies
was not significant (b ¼ 0:09, p ¼ :49), with group-based anger significantly predicting
collective action tendencies (b ¼ 0:56, p , :001). The results of the Sobel Test showed
that the indirect effect was significant (z ¼ 2:06, p ¼ :04). Thus, in line with
predictions, the identity salience manipulation affected peoples’ collective action
tendencies through their feelings of group-based anger (i.e. emotion-focused coping
with collective disadvantage). In other words, we conceptually replicated the first key
effect obtained in Study 1 by again showing that the relevance of group identity
facilitates emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage.
We then tested for the hypothesized interaction effect between identity salience and
group efficacy on collective action tendencies by running another multiple regression in
which the effects of the manipulation, group efficacy, group-based anger, and the two-
way interactions between identity salience and group efficacy, and between identity
salience and group-based anger were entered to predict collective action tendencies.
The results showed significant effects only for group-based anger (b ¼ 0:45, p , :01),
Table 2. Correlations between main dependent variables in Study 2
2. 3. 4.
1. Identity salience manipulation .34* .19 .29†
2. Group-based anger .51* .60*
3. Group efficacy .73*
4. Collective action tendencies
Note. *p , :05; †p , :07.
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for group efficacy (b ¼ 0:48, p , :001), and for the interaction between identity
salience and group efficacy (b ¼ 20:30, p ¼ :02). None of the other effects were
significant (bs , j0:23j, ps . :09). Inspection of the predicted two-way interaction
effect (Figure 2) suggested support for our hypothesis: Collective action tendencies
were indeed predicted more strongly by group efficacy in the personal identity salience
condition (b ¼ 0:67, p , :001) than in the group identity salience condition (b ¼ 0:22,
p ¼ :31). Thus, these results provide more support for our second hypothesis that the
relevance of group identity moderates the link between group efficacy and collective
action tendencies. More specifically, when group identity is less relevant, group-efficacy
beliefs more strongly predict individuals’ collective action tendencies.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 support our hypothesis that the relevance of group identity (here
in terms of the contextual salience of group identity) facilitates emotion-focused coping.
Moreover, the results of Study 2 also support our hypothesis that the relevance of group
identity moderates the link between group efficacy and collective action tendencies.
This convergence of results is interesting given differences between the studies in terms
of method and context. For example, Study 2 employed an experimental manipulation
(tapping the more contextual relevance of group identity) whereas Study 1 employed a
measure (tapping the more chronic relevance of group identity) of the independent
variable. This convergence is in line with the idea that group identity salience and group
identification (although conceptually distinct) should theoretically have similar
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Figure 2. Two-way interaction effect between manipulation of identity salience and group efficacy on
collective action tendencies, Study 2.
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implications for collective action tendencies: They both indicate the relevance of group
identity to individuals’ (group-based) appraisal, emotion, and action tendencies.
Furthermore, results converged despite differences in context: Whereas participants sat
in isolated cubicles in Study 2, they were surrounded by fellow group members in a
crowd in Study 1. This convergence suggests good internal and external validity of the
results by confirming a similar pattern in both (controlled) laboratory and (externally
valid) field settings.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two empirical studies showed that the relevance of group identity influences how
individuals cope with collective disadvantage. Both the field and laboratory study
showed that stronger chronic (i.e. group identification) and stronger contextual
relevance of group identity (i.e. salience of group identity) relate differently to two
‘psychological mechanisms of collective action’, as represented by emotion- and
problem-focused coping (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). More specifically, results of both
studies supported the idea that stronger relevance of group identity increases collective
action tendencies through group-based anger (i.e. emotion-focused coping), whereas
group efficacy predicted collective action tendencies more strongly under conditions of
lower relevance of group identity. Thus, results support the idea that the relevance of
group identity facilitates emotion-focused coping and moderates problem-focused
coping with collective disadvantage. We discuss the theoretical and practical
implications of these findings, as well as the limitations of the current studies, below.
Theoretical implications
Theoretically, the results map nicely on to intergroup emotion theory (e.g. Mackie &
Smith, 2002; Smith, 1993) to the extent that stronger group identification and group
identity salience increase the experience of group-based emotions and their associated
action tendencies (e.g. Kessler & Holbach, 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt
et al., 2003). They also fit with the relative deprivation framework such that it is the
effective and group-based component of relative deprivation that is most predictive of
collective action (e.g. Smith & Ortiz, 2002). This highlights the importance of group-
based appraisals of injustice as antecedents of group-based anger about collective
disadvantage (e.g. Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Van Zomeren
et al., 2004). Moreover, the current findings also fit with the social identity framework in
the sense that lower relevance of group identity makes people attend less to
group goals, and more pragmatic in terms of pursuing the collective goals that coincide
with their individual goals (e.g. Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1999; Veenstra &
Haslam, 2000).
Our findings also specify the idea of two distinct ‘paths to protest’, conceptualized as
emotion- and problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al.,
2004). Since the relevance of group identity facilitates the former type of coping, it
moderates the latter type of coping (which is in line with the conceptual distinction
between primary appraisals of relevance, and secondary appraisals of control, power, or
strength; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001; Smith & Kessler, 2004). The current
work thus shows that relevance of group identity is an important determinant of how
individuals cope with collective disadvantage.
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A key theoretical implication of our findings is that strong relevance of group identity
may actually be able to overpower, or render irrelevant, possible group-efficacy
concerns (and constraints). This is an interesting interpretation of our argument
because it suggests that high identifiers may be likely to engage in collective action
independent of, or even despite, low group-efficacy beliefs, or even little hope and
scope for social change in general (Doosje et al., 2002). If true, this would be an
indication of quite an important psychological mechanism of collective action in the
sense that strong relevance of group identity may lead people to engage in collective
action when there are, from their individual perspective, few instrumental incentives
for doing so.
However, there are two reasons why our line of reasoning does not rule out the
possibility that both higher and lower identifiers can sometimes use both ways of
coping. First, that stronger relevance of group identity weakens the effect of group
efficacy on collective action tendencies does not imply that this effect is necessarily non-
existent for higher identifiers. Of course, it may very well become empirically
undistinguishable from zero at a certain level of relevance of group identity, but this is
not inherent in our argument. Second, people may appraise available contextual
resources that permit engaging in either or both ways of coping with collective
disadvantage. For example, individuals may use explicit contextual sources of group-
based anger or group efficacy to cope in a more emotion-focused way (e.g. when a
group leader’s rallying call emphasizes the injustice of collective disadvantage) or in a
more problem-focused way (e.g. when a group leader’s rallying call emphasizes the
efficacy of the group to fight their collective disadvantage).
Note that this contextual analysis fits nicely with the assumption of the dual pathway
model of coping with collective disadvantage that peoples’ experience and expression
of group-based anger is as ‘rational’, or at least as adaptive and functional, as more
instrumental motivations for collective action like group efficacy. Indeed, a contextual
analysis is consistent with an emerging consensus in the literature that emotions should
be viewed as functional responses to changing environments (e.g. Frank, 1988; Frijda,
1986, 2007; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001), and with the idea that coping
processes are dynamic responses to shifts or changes in the social context (e.g. Van
Zomeren et al., 2004). It is also fully in line with the flexibility of self-categorization
processes that are argued to underlie group-based appraisal, emotion, and action
tendencies (Smith, 1993).
Practical implications
Our results also speak directly to the practice of mobilizing people for collective action.
Indeed, the key practical implication of our findings is that group efficacy may be
particularly important for motivating collective action for those people for whom group
identity is less relevant. Admittedly, it is often hard to convert sympathizers into active
participants in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klander-
mans, 1994), and a lower relevance of group identity (such as a weaker sense of group
identification) may be one of the main reasons (e.g. Simon & Klandermans, 2001;
Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004). However, if raising peoples’ subjective group-efficacy beliefs is
key to mobilizing particularly those for whom relevance of group identity is less
relevant, then persuasive communications targeting these people should focus on their
more instrumental and pragmatic concerns (i.e. will our collective goals be achieved
through joint action?).
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More specifically, individuals’ stronger expectation that fellow group members will
support them through actual participation in collective action (i.e. instrumental
support) might be one of the key secondary appraisals (theoretically representing
appraisals of in-group control, power, or strength) that increase their group-efficacy
beliefs and hence their engagement in problem-focused coping with collective
disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In contrast, trying to raise group-based anger
among individuals for whom group identity is less relevant (e.g. by emphasizing
injustice) may not be very fruitful, unless it increases group relevance.
Consequently, another practical recommendation for moving those for whom group
identity is less relevant into collective action is to increase their sense of ‘groupness’.
Current results suggest that this can be accomplished by raising their (more chronic)
sense of group identification, but also the (more contextual) salience of their group
identity. Making group identity relevant to the self in these different ways should
facilitate individuals’ collective action tendencies through group-based anger, and make
their group-efficacy beliefs less predictive of their collective action tendencies.
Limitations and directions for future research
Two limitations of this set of studies should be noted. First, our measure of collective
action relies on participants’ action tendencies (as argued in particular by Frijda, 1986,
2007; but see also Lazarus, 1991, 2001) rather than their actual behaviour. Although we
certainly do not wish to equate action tendencies or intentions to behaviour, research
suggests that intentions are a good predictor of actual protest behaviour (De Weerd &
Klandermans, 1999). Second, both studies employed the same collective disadvantage
issue (i.e. the raising of college fees for students in The Netherlands) and hence may not
generalize to other issues. Aside from the point that in an experimental sense this is also
a strength of the present research (because it enables us to compare the results of the
studies better), a different issue employed in previous research (i.e. an increase in the
number of hours of research participation required of students; see Van Zomeren et al.,
2004, Study 2 and 3) has also produced evidence for the two ‘paths to protest’. Thus, we
have little reason to assume that the present results should not generalize to such other
issues of collective disadvantage.
Future research should focus on two different avenues. First, future research may
examine which structural and contextual factors can mobilize those for whom group
identity is less relevant. Because these individuals will be the most difficult to mobilize,
finding ways to mobilize them is both theoretically important and socially
consequential. For example, research has shown that the instability of the intergroup
status differential is a structural factor that aligns lower identifiers with their group
(Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers, 1993; see also Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume,
2001). Applied to the present context, stronger instability should result in stronger
group-efficacy beliefs and collective action tendencies (i.e. problem-focused coping).
Similarly, future research may examine whether and how structural and contextual
indicators of relevance of group identity (i.e. group identification and group identity
salience) interact (e.g. Yzerbyt et al., 2003). For example, a combination of stronger
group identification and group identity salience may result in a particularly strong
relevance of group identity, and hence particularly strong effects on emotion- and
problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage.
A second important avenue of future research is the systematic examination of
reverse causal effects, such as the influence of group efficacy and group-based anger on
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the relevance of group identity. For example, Kessler and Holbach (2005) showed that
although group identification can facilitate group-based anger, group-based anger can
also facilitate group identification. Similarly, it may be possible that although the
relevance of group identity does not necessarily facilitate group-efficacy beliefs, stronger
group-efficacy beliefs do result in stronger relevance of group identity. Such reverse
causal effects would fit nicely with our dynamic and context-sensitive perspective on
coping processes.
To conclude, our analysis of collective action suggests a dynamic and context-
sensitive approach to how stronger relevance of group identity leads people to cope
differently with collective disadvantage. Our analysis of two psychological mechanisms
of collective action, or two ‘paths to protest’, specifies multiple options for
disadvantaged group members in terms of when and how to engage in collective
action. This specification has both theoretical as well as applied value: Our approach fits
into recent theoretical models of group identity, emotion, efficacy, and action, and it
hopes to stimulate thinking about how to mobilize those who are easily, and not so
easily, mobilized. Our approach thus moves away from a static, deterministic view of the
relation between (the relevance of) group identity, group-based emotion, group efficacy
and collective action, and moves towards a more complex representation of the
different context-sensitive coping processes through which people become motivated
to engage in collective action to fight their collective disadvantage.
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